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From its declaration of independence in 1581 until these days of European 
unification Dutch foreign policy has always been a matter of ‘peace, profits 
and principles’, to quote the title of a classic study on the subject.1 Blending 
the Grotian ideal of concord and peace with the pursuit of maritime and 
commercial interests, the Netherlands has tried to maintain the proper 
balance of power amongst its European foes and friends. Its main partner, 
if not always ally, was Britain. Throughout the modern period Anglo-Dutch 
relations have been characterised by the delicate interplay between the 
political need for cooperation and the intense commercial rivalry in 
maritime and colonial affairs. As Joris Voorhoeve, a former – and rather 
disastrous – Dutch minister of defence, has observed, ‘from a purely 
political point of view’ Britain and the Netherlands should have been 
‘archenemies’. But their mutual political interest in containing the most 
dangerous continental power, be it Spain, France or later on Germany, 
limited all Anglo-Dutch confrontations to short military or diplomatic 
struggles which soon were ended by a compromise settlement.’2 
 
 
Elizabeth and the Dutch Revolt: The Treaty of Nonesuch 
 
Officially Anglo-Dutch cooperation started in 1585, a decisive year in the 
history of the Dutch Revolt. The situation seemed hopeless. Under the 
leadership of Alessandro Farnese Spanish and Italian forces had 
reconquered the southern provinces of the Low Countries. Bruges and 
Ghent, the main strongholds of radical Calvinism, fell in 1584, Brussels and 
Antwerp in 1585. Farnese’s stunning success was not only due to his 
military genius, but also to the chaotic defence policy of his adversary, the 
States General. The rebels seemed more divided than ever before. On top 
of all, William of Orange, the great political and spiritual leader of the 
Revolt, was assassinated in July 1584. His last words, ‘My God, have pity on 
 
1 Joris Voorhoeve, Peace, profits and principles. A study of Dutch foreign policy (The Hague 1979). 
2 Voorhoeve, Peace, profits and principles, 25. 
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my soul and this poor people’, bore testimony to the great confusion that 
afflicted the rebellious provinces.  
Orange had worked hard to overcome the internal divisions amongst 
the Dutch rebels. Internal concord and foreign aid were, as Orange saw it, 
the ‘bare necessities’ for the rebel cause. As the eternal enemy of the 
Habsburgs, who more or less surrounded the country from the south, the 
east and, if the Dutch Revolt were to be lost, also from the north, France 
was an obvious candidate for seeking alliances and aid; so were protestant 
England and the Lutheran German princes, with whom the Nassau family 
had strong historic ties. But from the very beginning German Lutherans 
were wary of Dutch Calvinists; they never actively supported the Dutch 
Revolt. For strategic and pragmatic reasons Orange favoured French aid. 
This policy was controversial, especially when it involved such dodgy 
figures as François, the Duke of Anjou. While in the provinces of Holland 
and Zeeland there was a distinct preference for an alliance with England. 
Farnese’s reconquista alarmed Queen Elizabeth. She decided to 
intervene directly in the Netherlands. The Treaty of Nonesuch, concluded 
three days after the fall of Antwerp in 1585, pledged military assistance in 
the shape of an English army in exchange for the right to put English 
garrisons in a number of Dutch towns, such as Flushing and Brill. The Earl 
of Leicester, one of the Queen’s confidants, led the English army. In 
February 1586 the States General appointed Leicester to the position of 
Governor-General with ‘absolute power’. Leicester, ambitious and Calvinist, 
supported by Reformed preachers and thousands of refugees from Flanders 
and Brabant, did not hesitate. In April he issued a prohibition on trade with 
the enemy on penalty of death. A special committee had to control whether 
the merchants observed the new regulation. Holland, which had already 
taken precautions to warrant its independence by appointing Orange’s son, 
Maurits of Nassau, stadholder and Johan van Oldenbarnevelt pensionary of 
the province, was furious. The conflict was aggravated when Leicester 
joined sides with radical groups in Utrecht and dismissed the moderate 
magistrates. 
The conflict between Leicester and Holland touched the essence of 
the Dutch political system. Whilst Leicester’s partisans argued that the 
Governor-General was the prime authority in the political system, Holland 
unequivocally asserted provincial sovereignty. Leicester was fighting a losing 
battle. He was no match for the political genius of Oldenbarnevelt, who 
systematically undermined his position. Moreover, Leicester’s bold 
performance highly displeased the English Queen, who preferred a far more 
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cautious approach. Finally, the sudden betrayal of the towns of Zutphen 
and Deventer by English commanders to the Spanish in January 1587 led to 
a rapid fall in popularity for the English. 
When it was revealed that Elizabeth was negotiating with Parma, and 
that Leicester was ordered to push the United Provinces to the negotiation 
table, the earl’s authority received its deathblow. In an Anjou-like fashion 
Leicester seized a number of towns, thus digging his own political grave. In 
December 1587 he left the United Provinces; in April 1588 he officially 
resigned as Governor-General. 
 
 
Oldenbarnevelt: foreign policy for a young republic 
 
The States of Holland had asserted their power and Oldenbarnevelt 
accepted the consequences. In the midst of the conflict with Leicester he set 
up a more effective defence policy. The States of Holland decided to raise a 
huge field army of its own and accepted the financial sacrifices involved. 
Maurits was put in charge of the new army. The year 1588 was the turning 
point. The invincible Armada was defeated and, under the military 
leadership of Maurits and his cousin William Louis of Nassau, stadholder of 
Friesland, a revolutionary reorganization of the army began. In 1590, when 
Farnese was once again ordered to sacrifice his campaign in the Netherlands 
and to intervene in France to assist the Catholic Holy League in their fight 
against Henry of Navarre, Maurits seized the opportunity to take the 
military initiative. The unexpected capture of Breda, by means of a Trojan 
ship, was the start of a reconquista that brought the northern and eastern 
provinces and a part of Brabant back under Dutch control. 
With Oldenbarnevelt as their leader the Dutch took full control over 
their government. Foreign princes were no longer asked to become 
governors or dodgy sovereigns. The United Provinces had found their way; 
they were becoming a republic. 
Oldenbarnevelt was the architect of foreign policy in the new 
republic.3 In the 1590s the approchement between King James VI of Scotland 
and the Dutch Republic began. In February 1595 James sent Robert 
Denniston as Scottish envoy to Holland. The Dutch were pleased. They 
                                                 
3 The classic general studies are A.Th. Van Deursen, Honni soit qui mal y pense? De Republiek 
tussen de mogendheden (1610-1612) (Amsterdam 1965) and Jan Den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, vols. I-
III (Haarlem 1960-1966). 
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quickly proposed to set up an international anti-Spanish alliance that would 
include Holland, Scotland and England; later in the year the States General 
granted a pension to the oldest son of James, Henry. After the death of 
Elizabeth on the 3rd of April 1603, Oldenbarnevelt decided immediately to 
set up a delegation to pay respect to the new king. Just as in 1598, when he 
had gone to France with an illustrious Dutch embassy, featuring young 
Hugo Grotius as the new miracle of Holland, in order to sound out Henry 
IV, so in 1604 Oldenbarnevelt was keen to meet James I in person. The 
presence of Frederick Henry, the younger son of William of Orange and by 
far the most charming member of the Nassau family, underlined the 
importance of the embassy.4 
            
James VI of Scotland (1566-1625)          Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547-1619) 
 
The trip to London was a mixed blessing. Whilst the new king had 
lauded Oldenbarnevelt in a letter from 1601, Holland’s leader now learnt 
that James saw the Dutch as rebels, who were revolting against their 
legitimate prince. James refused to join the Dutch war effort against Spain. 
Whilst the new king – to Oldenbarnevelt’s relief – did not refrain from the 
alliance with the Dutch, James emphasised his desire to live in peace with all 
European countries, including Spain. At the end of August 1604 England 
and Spain made peace with each other. The peace treaty with Spain 
                                                 
4 Den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, vol. II, 496. 
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weakened England’s position vis-à-vis the Dutch. Whilst Oldenbarnevelt 
realised that James would always want to appear and be honoured as 
Holland’s best friend, the king’s friendship had strong limits. James would 
and could never make war for the sake of the Dutch alliance. 
Like William of Orange, Oldenbarnevelt was convinced that France, 
governed by Henry IV, was Holland’s most important ally. The protestant 
sympathies of Henry would strengthen the natural antagonism between 
France and the Habsburgs, whose threat to the French still came, as in the 
old days of Charles V and François I, from three sides, the south, the north 
and the east. Given this situation an alliance between France and the new 
republic was imperative for as long as Henry’s war with Spain lasted. As 
before, many Dutch, including most notably stadholder Maurits of Nassau, 
felt uneasy about relying too much on Catholic allies. Henry’s willingness to 
convert, because Paris was worth a mass, increased the doubts of many 
Dutch. Maurits and those who saw the conflict between Catholicism and 
Protestantism as the principal line of political division in Europe preferred 
strengthening the protestant alliance with the English. From 1612 Maurits 
opposed Oldenbarnevelt’s foreign policy openly; the approchement with the 
English, with ambassador Sir Ralph Winwood in particular, became 
apparent when the stadholder was made a member of the Order of the 
Garter in 1613. Oldenbarnevelt did not oppose the alliance with James I but 
he viewed it with increasing scepticism. As Oldenbarnevelt saw it caution, 
the desire for peace, fear of war with Spain and the lust for maritime profits, 
exemplified by the activities of pirates such as Drake and Hawkins, 
continued to be the driving forces of Jacobean foreign policy. 
Both Oldenbarnevelt and James were key players in the process of 
state formation in their countries. Both had only limited control over the 
classical instruments of statemaking, coercion and capital.5 In England, as 
Kevin Sharpe and others have emphasised, ‘the power of the crown and 
state depended largely upon its representation of authority.’ Unlike other 
European monarchs James ‘had no standing army or independent 
bureaucracy to enforce his will’, which meant that ‘both the cooperation of 
the political nation and the obedience of the lower orders rested more on a 
culture and ideology of order than on physical coercion.’6 Above all James 
                                                 
5 Charles Tilly, Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1992 (Cambridge/Oxford 1990). 
6 Kevin Sharpe, ‘The King’s writ. Royal authors and royal authority in early modern England’ 
in: Kevin Sharpe and Peter Lake ed., Culture and politics in early Stuart England (Basingstoke 
1994) 117. 
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used the power of the word ‘to reaffirm and reauthorize paradigms that 
sustained his divine right.’7 The royal writings were important ‘acts of 
government’, vigorous responses to political challenges and major ‘attempts 
to lead men to God’s reason and goodness through royal representation of 
His divine truths.’8  
Unlike James Oldenbarnevelt never pretended to be divine or 
Solomonic. But just as with James the political eminence of Oldenbarnevelt 
rested to an important extent on his formidable powers of persuasion. In 
the peculiar constitutional interplay of town councils, provincial parliaments 
and States-General no political leader or faction could rule by dictate; never-
ending negotiations, endless wheeling and dealing were – and are – the 
bread and butter of Dutch politics. From 1586 until his dramatic fall in 
1619 Oldenbarnevelt was the master of this Dutch theatre of politics. The 
Dutch leader had, in the words of Louis Aubery du Maurier, ‘une presence 
majestueuse, & disoit beaucoup en peu de paroles, avec un eloquence grave 
et succincte.’9 Oldenbarnevelt used his talents and powers to turn the 
republic into a powerful state – with its own standing army and with a 
network of committees and councils that, in addition to the representative 
institutions of towns and provinces, made up the republican state apparatus 
that astounded so many foreign observers. 
 Like James, Oldenbarnevelt appreciated the necessity of developing a 
‘culture and ideology’ for the new commonwealth. Whilst Oldenbarnevelt 
has often been seen as ‘a political opportunist’, who followed the maxims of 
‘reason of state’,10 it is important to note that he was keen to promote and 
steer public intellectual debate on all key issues, including the main areas of 
conflict and dialogue with the English ally. Hugo Grotius became 
Oldenbarnevelt’s main political and intellectual confidante. Grotius played a 
dominant role in the commercial and colonial debates with England and he 
was the principal spokesman in the public debate on the conflict over the 
relationship between ecclesiastical authority and civil government that 
dominated Anglo-Dutch relations after 1610. Grotius was to 
Oldenbarnevelt what Locke was to Shaftesbury. 
 
                                                 
7 Sharpe, ‘The king’s writ’, 131. 
8 Ibidem, 124. 
9 Louis Aubery du Maurier, Memoires pour server à l’Histoire de Hollande, et des autres Provinces-
Unies (Paris 1711) 277. 
10 See most recently A.Th. van Deursen, Maurits van Nassau (1567-1625). De winnaar die faalde 
(Amsterdam 2000) 143, 241, 273. 
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The Anglo-Dutch debate on the constitution: Wilkes against Vranck 
 
From the very beginning Anglo-Dutch relations were a fascinating blend of 
political and intellectual exchange. In the 1580s the founding father of the 
new university of Leiden, Janus Dousa, was at the vanguard of both the 
diplomatic attempt to enlist English support for the Dutch Revolt and the 
intensification of humanist contacts. Justus Lipsius and Philip Sidney were 
not only leading the renaissance of Tacitism in their countries, they were 
also keen supporters of the Earl of Leicester and advocates of a strong 
central government in the United Provinces.11 The first major Anglo-Dutch 
debate concerned the controversies over the constitutional make up of the 
Dutch provinces.12 Sidney thought that Leicester had been invited to come 
to the United Provinces as a Roman dictator. Sidney said that ‘he had learnt 
from history that when the state of the republic of Rome had been in utter 
peril or danger, as the Netherlands nowadays are, which [the Dutch] fully 
acknowledge, it had been necessary to create a dictatorship, with absolute 
power and disposition over everything concerning the prosperity of the 
country, without any instruction, limitation or restriction.’13 Amongst the 
English the expectation was that the Dutch would, in the words of Fulke 
Greville, ‘metamorphose this new aristocracy of theirs into their ancient and 
much honoured form of dukedom’,14 with first Leicester and then perhaps 
Sidney himself in the position of duke. Given this profound 
misunderstanding of both the history and contemporary politics of the Low 
Countries, the English counsellors were stupefied by Oldenbarnevelt’s coup 
against Leicester and they expressed strong doubts about its legitimacy. On 
16 March 1587,15 Thomas Wilkes accused the States of Holland of ‘reducing’ 
the authority of Leicester. Wilkes argued that the commission of the States 
General had awarded Leicester, ‘the supreme command and absolute 
authority’ both in military and political affairs, ‘as the Governor Generals 
                                                 
11 Jan van Dorsten, Poets, patrons, and professors. Sir Philip Sidney, Daniel Rogers and the Leiden 
Humanists (Leiden 1962) and Blair Worden, The sound of virtue. Philip Sidney’s Arcadia and 
Elizabethan politics (New Haven and London 1996). 
12 Martin van Gelderen, The political thought of the Dutch Revolt, 1555-1590 (Cambridge 1992) 
199-207. 
13 Sidney as quoted in Worden, The sound of virtue, 247. 
14 Greville as quoted in Ibidem, 247 
15 T. Wilkes, Remonstrance (1587) in: P.C. Bor, Den oorspronck, begin ende aenvanck der Nederlandtscher 
oorlogen, geduyrende de regeringe van de Hertoginne van Parma, de Hertoge van Alba, ende eensdeels vanden 
groot Commandeur, Vol. 2 (1679) 918-921.  
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have had in the times of Charles V.’16 Oldenbarnevelt and the States of 
Holland had now fatally wounded this authority. Wilkes presented a long list 
of accusations and questioned the States’ claim to sovereign power. He 
argued that ‘by default of a legal Prince’ sovereignty belonged ‘with the 
community’, not with the States, who were ‘but servants, ministers and 
deputies of the aforesaid community.’17 As Wilkes pointed out, the 
community had limited the authority of the States, setting conditions to their 
functioning and decisions. Therefore, their authority was as different from 
sovereignty as ‘heaven is different from hell’ for, as Wilkes put it, ‘sovereignty 
is not limited neither in power, nor in command, nor in time.’18 Still less, 
Wilkes added, the States represented sovereignty, for such was precisely the 
role of the Governor General, described ‘as a dispositarius or guardian of 
sovereignty until it pleases the prince or the people to revoke it.’19 
 It had become common sense in the United Provinces to present the 
States as representative institutions of the people; the idea of popular 
sovereignty, underlining the authority of the community, had become another 
key element in the justification of the Revolt. Wilkes used the idea of the 
States as delegates, who acted on order and instruction, to arrive at a radical 
conclusion. Combined with the notion, probably derived from Bodin, that 
sovereignty could not be limited, neither in power nor in time, Wilkes reduced 
the importance of the States and rejected their claims to political dominance, 
let alone sovereignty. 
 Oldenbarnevelt recognised the necessity of responding to Wilkes’ 
Remonstrance. The town pensionary of Gouda, François Vranck, was asked to 
write a defence of the authority of the States. Originally a declaration of the 
States of Holland, Vranck’s work was published, in a slightly revised version, 
as the Short exposition of the right exercised from old times by the Knighthood, Nobles and 
Towns of Holland and Westvriesland for the maintenance of the liberties, rights, privileges 
and laudable customs of the country.20 Like Wilkes, Vranck accepted popular 
sovereignty as the foundation of the Dutch constitution, but unlike Wilkes, 
Vranck argued that in Holland the concept of ‘the people’ referred to the 
                                                 
16 Wilkes, Remonstrance, 918-919. 
17 Ibidem, 921. 
18 Ibidem. 
19 Ibidem. 
20 Francois Vranck, ‘Short exposition of the right exercised from all old times by the 
knighthood, nobles and towns of Holland and Westvriesland for the maintenance of the 
liberties, rights, privileges and laudable customs of the country’ in: Martin van Gelderen ed., 
The Dutch Revolt (Cambridge 1993) 227-238. 
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corporations of the ‘nobles and towns’. Vranck admitted that the States 
were representative institutions whose work had to be seen in terms of 
delegation. A delegate, participating in the States, could only act ‘in 
conformity with his instruction and commission.’ The delegates received 
their instruction from their principals, the estates of nobles and towns. But 
according to Vranck this did not diminish the importance of the States. For 
although sovereignty resided with the people, it was administered by their 
delegates, the States. Shrewdly employing Bodin’s own distinction between 
the location and the administration of sovereignty, Vranck concluded ‘that 
the sovereignty of the country is with the States in all matters.’ 
 Vranck’s Short exposition became canonical; it has been called the 
‘Magna Charta’ of the Dutch Republic.21 It did not of course settle the debate 
on the Dutch constitution. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the 
complexity of the debate was deepened, when the rift between the public 
church and civil government was opened up. James I became the most 
distinguished international contributor to a debate and conflict that brought 
the republic on the brink of collapse. The conflict between Arminians and 
Gomarists, or Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants, and the dramatic 
stand-off between Oldenbarnevelt and Maurits, culminating in the tragic 
beheading of the ninety year old statesman, have become defining moments 
in Dutch history. From the very beginning their interpretation has been 
deeply controversial, exemplifying profound rifts in Dutch society, not just in 
contemporary society but also in Dutch historiography. Liberal, Catholic and 
Calvinist historians have all given their versions of the drama, arriving at 
widely diverging conclusions. 
 
 
Calvinists and regents 
 
Most historians would agree that the coalition between Dutch Calvinists and 
the town regents in Holland had always been frail and uneasy. In 1581 the 
national Synod of Middelburg fully affirmed the Presbyterian organization 
and doctrine of the Dutch church.22 The corpus disciplinae delineated the duties 
                                                 
21 Den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, vol. I, 402. 
22 W. van ’t Spijker, ‘De Acta van de synode van Middelburg (1581)’ in: J.P. van Dooren, De 
nationale synode te Middelburg (Middelburg 1981) 64-128 and R.H. Bremmer, ‘De nationale synode 
van Middelburg (1581). Politieke achtergronden van kerkelijke besluitvorming’ in: J.P. van 
Dooren, De nationale synode te Middelburg (Middelburg 1981)1-63. 
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of the church servants, ministers, elders and deacons, and affirmed that 
church government consisted of consistories and the so called ‘greater 
assemblies’, classes, particular (provincial) synods and finally the national 
synod. Three years earlier, the National Synod of Dordrecht had decided that 
church ministers should be appointed by the consistory in cooperation with 
the deacons and the classis. Having elected a minister, he was to be presented 
to the ‘reformed government’ and the congregation, which both had two 
weeks time to protest against the appointment. Thus by way of minor 
concession the synod recognised that in the procedure of appointing 
ministers town magistrates had a limited right of protest. But the consistory 
had the final word. The synod emphasised that the civil government was not 
entitled to appoint or dismiss ministers at its own will. With regard to the 
appointment of elders the synod claimed an even more exclusive right, not 
acknowledging any right of confirmation on behalf of the town government. 
 This bold assertion of the independence of the Reformed Protestant 
church was unacceptable to a majority of the towns and States of Holland. 
One of the sternest opponents was the town of Leiden. In 1579 Leiden 
expressed its strong disagreement with the synod. Leiden argued that the 
appointment of ministers, elders and deacons pertained to the magistrate. 
Leiden’s position was presented in a famous Justification, written by Dirck 
Volckertsz. Coornhert. It accused the consistory of trying to ‘usurp’ the 
‘magistrate’s regiment’ and avowed that the magistrate ‘being relieved of the 
awkward yoke of the tyrannical Romanists’, did not intend to bear ‘a new 
form of yoke from anyone else.’23 
 As the treatise pointed out, the Reformed Protestant consistory 
demanded the ‘prohibition, constraint and punishment’ by the town 
magistrate of Mennonites, Roman Catholics and all other religious groupings. 
Whilst the town magistrate was not allowed to interfere in church affairs, it 
was expected to execute the orders of the Reformed Protestants. With this 
policy, the Justification argued, Reformed Protestants threaded in the footsteps 
of the Inquisition, as they demanded the force of conscience, which had been 
‘the root cause of this bloody war.’ If Reformed Protestants denied the 
Magistrate an independent judgment in religious affairs, then the aim of the 
consistory was to subject the Magistrate, to control its sword and to make it 
act like Pilate, who followed the wishes of the Pharisees without making a 
proper judgment himself. 
                                                 
23 D. Volckertsz Coornhert, Justificatie des magistraets tot Leyden in Hollant (Amsterdam 1579) fol 
A4; and Van Gelderen, The political thought, 230-231. 
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 As the Justification saw it, God instituted the magistrate ‘to the defence 
of the pious and to the chastisement of the evil.’ If this divinely ordained 
power was not to be abused, as had happened under the Inquisition, then the 
magistrate needed to have ‘lawful knowledge’ of the persons one wanted to 
appoint ‘as shepherds in the church or shepherd-stable of Christ.’24 On the 
basis of its divinely ordained duty the Magistrate had a rightful claim to the 
authority over the ‘election and approbation’ of ‘church servants’. 
 Moreover, the ‘office’ of the magistrate was to take precautions and to 
settle disputes in both political and ecclesiastical affairs, especially if these 
tended to ‘a common sedition’. This did not imply complete control over 
ecclesiastical affairs. The magistrate merely wanted to prevent the 
appointment of ‘seditious spirits’ in the consistory in order to safeguard the 
church from a new form of popery. 
 The Leiden Justification was music to the ears of politicians such as 
Oldenbarnevelt, who, whilst clearly sympathizing and agreeing with the main 
aspects of Reformed Protestantism, were not willing the replace the ‘popery 
of Rome’ with the ‘popery of Geneva’. The outspoken support of many 
ministers for the Earl of Leicester had merely widened the divide between the 
Calvinist church and Oldenbarnevelt. In 1591 a committee of politicians and 
ministers was formed to discuss the church government and its relation to the 
civil government. Oldenbarnevelt joined the committee and to his own 
surprise he rather liked two of the ministers, Jacobus Arminius and Johannes 
Uyttenbogaert. At the instigation of Uyttenbogaert, who became one of his 
closest friends, Oldenbarnevelt even decided to join the church. 
 
 
Arminian troubles 
 
In 1602 Oldenbarnevelt was happy to support the proposal, engineered 
mainly by Uyttenbogaert and young Hugo Grotius, to appoint Jacobus 
Arminius to a chair in theology at the university of Leiden. The appointment 
was controversial. As a minister in Amsterdam Arminius had raised questions 
concerning the proper understanding of the doctrine of predestination within 
Calvinist theology.25 From the very beginning the debate had an Anglo-Dutch 
                                                 
24 Coornhert, Justificatie, fol B6. 
25 For a biography of Arminius see Carl Bangs, Arminius. A study in the Dutch Reformation 
(second edition; Grand Rapids, Mich. 1985). The most important recent studies on 
Arminius’ theology are Richard A. Muller, God, creation, and providence in the thought of Jacob 
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dimension. One of Arminius’ earliest works was the Modest Examination of Dr. 
Perkins’s Pamphlet, a response to William Perkins’s study De Praedestinatonis modo 
et ordine.26 The Examen Perkinsiani is one of Arminius’ richest texts, discussing 
key theological questions concerning supralapsarianism, election, providence 
and predestination. Against Perkins, a keen defender of the doctrine of 
double predestination, ‘teaching that God had divided mankind 
unconditionally into elect and reprobate even before the fall of Adam’,27 
Arminius argued in favour of a concept of predestination that would do 
justice to the subtlety of the interplay between man’s free will and God’s 
grace.  
 Written between 1599 and 1602 the Examen Perkinsiani was published 
in 1612, after Arminius’ death, when the Dutch Republic was in the midst of 
the Arminian troubles. The debate on free will and predestination was a fatal 
test for the frail relationship between ecclesiastical and secular authority, 
especially in Holland. Oldenbarnevelt was not troubled by the theological 
debate itself; he probably was not really interested. Throughout the years of 
the Arminian troubles he said and wrote very little about predestination. The 
few paragraphs Oldenbarnevelt devoted to the issue emphasised the 
‘simplicity’ of his beliefs. In a letter to his envoy in London, Caron, 
Oldenbarnevelt wrote that all his life he had felt ‘that a good Christian should 
believe that he is predestined to eternal salvation by God’s grace, because 
through God’s grace he has the firm belief that his salvation is solely founded 
on God’s grace and on the redemption of ours sins by our Saviour Jesus 
Christ.’28 Whilst these words were plainly protestant, it is not so easy to 
interpret them as Arminian. Oldenbarnevelt seems to take the high road or 
                                                                                                             
Arminius. Sources and directions of scholastic Protestantism in the era of early Orthodoxy (Grand Rapids, 
Mich. 1991) and Eef Dekker, Rijker dan Midas. Vrijheid, genade en predestinatie in de theologie van 
Jacobus Arminius (1559-1609) (Zoetermeer 1993); for a succinct study of Arminius’ thinking 
on free will and predestination, see Eef Dekker, ‘Theologische en filosofische vrijheid in de 
vroege zeventiende eeuw’ in: Eco Haitsma Mulier, Wyger Velema ed., Vrijheid. Een geschiedenis 
van de vijftiende tot de twintigste eeuw (Amsterdam 1999) 53-69. 
26 For the English translation see Jacobus Arminus, ‘Modest examination of Dr. Perkins’s 
pamphlet’ in: Jacobus Arminius, The Works of James Arminius The London edition, vol. 3, 
(London 1875; repr. Grand Rapids, Mich. 1986) 249-484. 
27 Nicholas Tyacke, Anti-Calvinists. The rise of English Arminianism c. 1590-1640 (Oxford 1987), 
29; see also Peter White, Predestination, policy and polemic. Conflict and consensus in the English 
Church from the Reformation to the Civil War (Cambridge 1992). 
28 ‘Oldenbarnevelt aan Caron’ (18 October 1617) in: A.J. Veenendaal ed., Johan van 
Oldenbarnevelt. Bescheiden betreffende zijn staatkundig beleid en zijn familie, vol. III: 1614-1620 (The 
Hague 1967) 358; see also Den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, vol. III, 17. 
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occupy a safe middle ground. But with the church split between the followers 
of Arminius and his Leiden counterpart Franciscus Gomarus, it became 
imperative to resolve the theological controversy. Vital questions needed to 
be answered. Should theological questions be settled by a national synod of 
the church or should diversity be accepted, as long as the fundamentals of 
Protestantism were not at stake? Who should decide? Was it the church itself, 
was it the States General as the highest federal institution or was each 
province sovereign in decreeing its own solution? The Arminian troubles 
entailed fundamental debates about the nature of the church, its position in 
and relation to the commonwealth and the location of sovereignty within the 
Dutch Republic. From the beginning of the Dutch Revolt these issues had 
been looming; between 1610 and 1619 they were brought to their fateful 
climax. 
 Searching for answers Oldenbarnevelt relied heavily on the intellectual 
and political assistance of his closest confidantes, Uyttenbogaert and Grotius. 
In 1610 Uyttenbogaert published his Treatise on the office and authority of a higher 
Christian government in church affairs.29 It included a refined dissection of the 
Counter-Remonstrant view on the relationship between church and civil 
government. Counter-Remonstrants endorsed the view that ecclesiastical and 
civil authorities were wielding very distinct powers of totally different kinds in 
two different spheres. In the words of Nobbs, ‘the authority of the church 
was in religion and was a spiritual power; the sovereignty of the ruler 
governed external life by that coercion which was effective only upon the 
body. So long as each was active in its own sphere and faithfully observed the 
limits of its own function, there was no collateral authority and no possibility 
of conflict.’30 Uyttenbogaert, however, insisted that this view implied 
‘collaterality’. Church and civil power were collateral; there was ‘an equal high 
power for the ecclesiastical and secular authorities within the 
commonwealth.’31 Counter-Remonstrants did not acknowledge the 
superiority of the supreme civil magistrate, of the sovereign. The 
commonwealth, so it seemed, had two sovereigns. 
 Ever since his visit to London Oldenbarnevelt believed that, whatever 
differences there might be with James I, they shared a distinct distaste for 
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radical Presbyterians and an even stronger preference for the superiority of 
secular over ecclesiastical authority. In 1611 Oldenbarnevelt was shocked to 
find that James sided with radical Presbyterian theologians such as Sybrandus 
Lubbertus, professor of Divinity at the University of Franeker in Friesland, to 
oppose the appointment of Conrad Vorstius as the successor of Arminius in 
Leiden. In the judgement of James Vorstius was, so he told ambassador 
Caron, ‘a pernicious person’, who had repeatedly ‘fallen into great errors in 
his interpretations and doubts concerning the divinity and Christ.’ James 
deemed these errors to be ‘wholly impious, godless, and yes full of 
Arminianism.’32 In his public declaration on the affair, James went as far as to 
brand Vorstius as an ‘Atheist’, indeed ‘a Viper, who may make a fearful rent, 
not only in their Ecclesiastical, but also in their [the Dutch] politic state.’33 
Oldenbarnevelt was stunned: ‘I can really not believe, that on the issue of 
predestination and all that depends on it, the King would be so strict as to 
condemn all other opinions but those of Calvin and Beza.’34 Holland’s leader 
not only failed to recognise that James attack on Vorstius was not about 
predestination but about Socinianism; Oldenbarnevelt also did not see that, as 
Peter White has remarked, in attacking Vorstius, James ‘was concerned to 
vindicate his own orthodoxy.’35 From their side the English king and his 
counsellors failed to recognize that by presenting their grievances to the States 
General, where the English ambassador was entitled to speak, they were 
touching the heart and nerve of the Dutch political system, the issue of 
sovereignty. The appointment of Vorstius in Leiden was a matter for the 
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States of Holland and the town and university of Leiden, not of the States 
General. As Leicester had done before, the English were once again 
offending Holland’s pride, its provincial sovereignty and civic autonomy. 
Moreover, the publication of James’ Declaration in 1612 turned the Vorstius 
affair into a public conflict. James and Oldenbarnevelt were now asserting 
and claiming their authority in Holland’s public sphere. More than ever their 
authority depended on political and theological argument, on powers of 
rhetoric and persuasion. 
 
             
Conrad Vorstius (1569-1622)    Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) 
 
 
James I and Hugo Grotius 
 
For Oldenbarnevelt it was vital to loosen the coalition between King James 
and the Counter-Remonstrants. He managed to engineer a letter from James, 
published in 1613, in which the King acknowledged and praised the authority 
of the States General in church affairs and called upon them to use their 
‘public authority’ to silence the disputes on predestination.36 Emboldened by 
                                                 
36 The letter was published as Copie van den Brief des Conings van Groot Britannien, gheschreven aen 
de E.M. Heeren Staten Generael der Gheunieerde Provincien. Waer in hy sijn Aadvijs,nopende het different 
tusschen de Remonstranten ende Contra-Remonstranten over-schrijft (1613) Knuttel Pamphlet 2061. 
Martin van Gelderen  
 
 
80 
this development Oldenbarnevelt secretly instructed Hugo Grotius to discuss 
the Arminian troubles with James in person. From 30 March 1613 until 31 
May Grotius was in England as the most prominent member of a delegation 
of the Dutch East India Company to discuss a number of commercial issues, 
most importantly the English protests against the Dutch monopoly on trade 
with a number of Spice Islands, which, as the English delegates were keen to 
point out, seemed to contradict Grotius’ own work on the freedom of the 
seas.37 
 Grotius met James on 16 April and again on 15 and 21 May 1613. The 
reports on these meetings vary. There is agreement that James smiled, but the 
smile must have been ambivalent. According to the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, George Abbott, James was deeply irritated by the arrogance and 
‘tedious tittletattle’ of the Dutch humanist.38 Grotius meanwhile was 
convinced of his own success. He thought his exposé of the position of the 
Counter-Remonstrants, of their refusal to give civil government any say in the 
election of church ministers had convinced James that the Counter-
Remonstrants were, as the king had exclaimed himself, ‘the veriest puritans.’39 
Grotius also felt that James had sympathy with the proposal to set up a 
General Council of Protestant Churches, which would establish the 
fundamentals of Christianity and would call for moderation in the debates on 
less important issues such as predestination. James himself, Grotius wrote to 
his friend Isaac Casaubon, with whom he developed the idea, would, as ‘the 
wisest of Kings’ be ‘its president and moderator.’ Establishing such a General 
Council was a matter of urgency, if only because, as Grotius wrote, ‘every age 
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does not produce learned Christian Kings, nor will England always have a 
Casaubon’, praised by Grotius as the direct successor of Erasmus.40 
 The call for a General Council continued to be an important element 
in the Grotian search for concord and toleration amongst Christians. As in 
his moral and political philosophy Grotius sought to solve conflicts in 
theology by emphasising the shared foundations of the churches. These 
shared foundations had to be derived by way of rational argument, thus 
guaranteeing their universal acceptance. Grotius developed this approach in 
Meletius, a manuscript written in 1611. It was his first attempt to defend 
religious toleration on the basis of a number of decreta and praecepta, which all 
faithful must accept.41 In Meletius Grotius identified this approach with the 
stoic teaching of Seneca and Cicero that ‘all voluntary actions are preceded by 
the understanding [intellectus] that necessarily consists of two parts: the one 
theoretical, the other practical.’ The theoretical part should be based on a 
number of dogmata, decreta, from which fundamental ethical precepts, praecepta, 
must be derived. As far as religious debates were concerned this stoic 
approach had been favoured in particular by Christian Humanists, starting 
with Erasmus himself. It became the basis of Grotius’ irenicism, which found 
its culmination in De Veritate Religiones Christianae, which Grotius himself 
probably regarded as his most important work. 
 Returning home in May 1613 Grotius was optimistic about the 
prospects for his ambitious irenic programme, which would restore unity in 
European Protestantism and concord in the United Provinces. But back 
home discord prevailed. In July 1613 Sibrandus Lubbertus published the 
massive Commentary on the ninety-nine errors of Conrad Vorstius.42 In a clever move 
Lubbertus dedicated it to George Abbott. Lubbertus reiterated the accusation 
that the proposal to appoint Vorstius in Leiden had been an attempt to 
introduce Socinian heresies into the church, and he strongly rejected both the 
equation of Dutch Counter-Remonstrants with English Puritans and the 
accusation that the Counter-Remonstrants did not acknowledge any form of 
ecclesiastical hierarchy. Informed by Lubbertus’ Commentary James now 
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started to wonder whether Grotius’ clarification of Counter-Remonstrant 
doctrines had been deceitful. Grotius had to respond. Urgency was required; 
Grotius wrote his reply in less than a month.43 
 
 
Ordinum Pietas 
 
The Ordinum Hollandiae ac Westfrisiae Pietas was the most comprehensive 
justification of the policy of Oldenbarnevelt, Grotius and their allies in the 
States of Holland to appear during the Arminian troubles.44 The Latin version 
was published in October 1613, the Dutch translation, prepared by 
Uyttenbogaert, followed immediately and the French translation appeared a 
little later. The multi-lingual publishing campaign of Ordinam Pietas indicated 
the importance of the work; it was aimed to appeal to an international 
audience, to James I and other English readers in particular. Grotius 
emphasised the importance of the Anglo-Dutch alliance and praised the great 
liberality of King James, who, Grotius wrote, ‘even after he had concluded 
peace with the Spaniards had constantly shown how much he had the welfare 
of our commonwealth, reipublicae nostrae salus, at heart.’45 Grotius underlined 
the king’s ‘faithful, wise and salutary counsel’ that ‘public authority is needed’ 
to settle the disputes on predestination and he endorsed the view, which he 
attributed to James, that the conflicting theological ‘opinions do not differ so 
much that they are inconsistent with the truth of the Christian faith and the 
salvation of the souls.’46 The problem with the Counter-Remonstrants was 
that they were neither willing to be charitable in church disputes nor prepared 
to accept the authority of the supreme magistrate to arbitrate and settle such 
disputes. In this sense Counter-Remonstrants were Puritans, who, Grotius 
writes, ‘deny that the King is the head of the external Anglican Church.’47  
 These remarks exemplify Grotius’ strategy to defame the Counter-
Remonstrants and to sway the opinion of James I. But they also point to the 
heart of the conflict. Au fond Counter-Remonstrants disagreed profoundly 
with Grotius’ theory of commonwealth and church, with his views on 
sovereignty and his plea for toleration. Grotius had developed his theory of 
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the formation of the commonwealth and the location of sovereignty in one of 
his earliest, unpublished works, De Iure Praedae.48 Here Grotius explains that 
for reasons of demographic growth, better protection and greater economic 
convenience, lone individuals, living in the state of natural liberty, start to 
create small societies, which are ‘formed by general consent for the sake of 
the common good.’49 The respublica refers to a multitude of private persons 
who have come together to improve their protection through mutual aid 
and to assist each other in acquiring the necessities of life. At their own free 
will these individuals unite by way of civil contract – Grotius uses the term 
foedus – in a ‘unified and permanent body’ with its own set of laws. From 
singuli they turn themselves into cives, citizens. 
The laws of the commonwealth emanate from its will as a unified 
body based on consent. Grotius argues that ‘civil power, manifesting itself 
in laws and judgements, resides primarily and essentially in the bosom of the 
commonwealth itself.’50 Of course not everybody has the time to devote 
himself to the administration of civil affairs. The exercise of lawful power is 
therefore entrusted to a number of magistrates, who act for the common 
good. By mandate the magistrates have the authority to make laws for the 
respublica, which bind all citizens. Grotius uses the concept of magistratus to 
emphasise that those who exercise civil power, be they king, princes, counts, 
States assemblies or town councils, are administrators. Arguing that ‘just as 
every right of the magistrate comes from the commonwealth, so every right 
of the commonwealth comes from private persons’, Grotius reaffirms later 
in De Iure Praedae that ‘public power is constituted by collective consent.’51 
Following Vranck, Grotius makes a crucial distinction between the 
residence of supreme civil power and its administration. The supreme 
power of the commonwealth remains intact even after the appointment of 
one or more magistrates but the administration of public powers is to be 
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divided amongst various magistrates. When he compares the constitutions 
of the ancient glorious republics, Grotius accepts the pleas of the wisest 
men for a respublica mixta, in the sense that a single civitas combines ‘the 
majesty of a prince with the authority of a senate and the liberty of the 
people’. Grotius has a distinct preference for a respublica mixta where the 
aristocratic element dominates. In his highly popular Treatise of the antiquity of 
the Batavian now Hollandish Republic from 1610, in many ways the successor to 
Vranck’s Short exposition, Grotius argues that Holland had been such a 
virtuous republic of optimates since the days of Roman antiquity.52 
The public church is part of this commonwealth. As public office the 
public church stands under the authority of the magistrate, who holds and 
administers civil power on behalf of the unified body of citizens that make 
up the commonwealth. This conception of the position of the public 
church in the commonwealth implies, to quote Grotius, that ‘nobody has 
the right to decide on the faith of the Church inasmuch as it is public, 
except for him in whose hand and power all public bodies lie.’53 By 
implication it is the office of the supreme magistrate to appoint church 
officials. Grotius writes: ‘Since the assignment of public offices of any kind 
is the task of those who wield supreme power, it is also his task wherever 
there is a public Church to charge suitable men with the care and 
functioning of the church in a certain city or place, not only because it 
pertains to him to enable his subjects to lead a life, that is respectful in every 
way, something that can hardly be achieved unless the ministers are good, 
but also because it is of great importance for the state of the commonwealth 
which men are entrusted with the ears and affects of the populace.’54  
Given the public status of the Church, it is part of the 
commonwealth; hence its oversight lies with the supreme magistrate, whose 
civil powers are derived from the unified body of citizens that make up the 
commonwealth. Grotius is keen to point out ‘that the form of government, 
regia or optimatium, does not make any difference.’55 The Grotian theory of 
church and commonwealth applies as much to Holland as it does to 
England. 
Grotius is also keen to point out the similarities between the 
churches of Holland and England. According to Grotius the Dutch church 
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is not primarily Lutheran or Calvinist; it is above all Erasmian. In a bold 
move Ordinum Pietas argues that as far as the debate on predestination and 
free will is concerned, the tradition going from Erasmus to Anastasius 
Veluanus and then, most notably, to Coornhert, is the true foundation of 
the Dutch church: ‘The majority of the population was, of its own accord, 
more inclined towards Erasmus’ judgement, and consequently the book 
written by Anastasius Velunaus, which argued the same point, was also 
joyfully received, and Dirck Coornhert’s cause, which for many reasons was 
otherwise odious, was made popular by nothing so much as the fact that he 
was believed to side with Erasmus on predestination and free will.’56 The 
hallmarks of the Erasmian church are concord, ‘peace and unanimity’, 
which requires, as Grotius argues with direct quotes from Erasmus, ‘that 
each party adapts itself somewhat to the other.’ Concord calls for 
unanimous agreement on the ‘absolute minimum’, the few fundamentals of 
Christianity, ‘leaving to each his own free judgement on many questions, 
because many things are very obscure.’57 Grotius is more than happy to 
endorse the opinion of his friend Isaac Casaubon that the Anglican Church 
under James I epitomizes the Erasmian dosage of Christian liberty. 
According to this rosy interpretation the Church of England should be the 
model for all Protestant Churches; in this rosy sense Grotian theology was 
Anglican in inspiration. 
It is important to note that in terms of its intellectual inspiration, 
Grotian theology went well beyond the confines of the Anglo-Dutch 
exchange. As always Grotius dwelled on a wide range of European sources, 
including the works of Leonardus Lessius, Philippus Melanchthon, Jean 
Bodin, Isaac Casaubon and perhaps most notably Marsilius of Padua and 
Fernando Vazquez, the Castilian councillor of Philip II. The Castilian 
connection was no coincidence. One of the ironies of the Arminian troubles 
was the profound influence of Spanish Neo-scholasticism on Calvinist 
debates. Arminius himself was deeply influenced by the work of Luis de 
Molina; Grotius was more than happy to acknowledge the importance of 
the work of Vitoria and above all Vazquez.58 In terms of intellectual history 
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the Anglo-Dutch exchange was embedded in the European ‘Republic of 
Letters’, of which Grotius became the embodiment after his dramatic 
escape from his prison in Loevestein in 1621. 
 
 
Tragedy 
 
For Oldenbarnevelt and Grotius the Arminian troubles ended in tragedy. 
The bold assertions in Ordinum Pietas put Grotius at the centre of debate 
and conflict. Reponses to Grotius were written by Johannes Bogerman, 
Antonius Walaeus and, of course, Lubbertus himself.59 As it turned out 
Grotius and Oldenbarnevelt were neither able to enlist the support of King 
James, who may have seen that Grotian political thought was rather 
different from his own work, nor to sway Dutch public opinion. When 
Maurits declared his support for the Counter-Remonstrant cause, the battle 
was lost for Grotius and Oldenbarnevelt. The lifestyle of Maurits, whose 
court exemplified the virtues and vices of the Dutch brothel, may have been 
a disgrace to the Counter-Remonstrants, but his popularity helped them to 
sway public debate, which turned out to be the decisive factor in the battle 
over public authority in the Dutch commonwealth. When the Synod of 
Dordrecht elevated the doctrine of double predestination to dogmatic 
heights, Grotian irenicism suffered a grave public defeat. But the victory of 
orthodox Calvinism was in many ways a pyrrhic one. Due to the decisive 
role of the stadholder the Calvinist church had to accept the de facto 
superiority of secular authority; on this issue Maurits was in complete 
agreement with his mentor and rival, Oldenbarnevelt. Moreover, whilst 
Grotius lost the political battle, his works had a long lasting powerful 
influence in framing the language of politics and law, not just in Holland, 
but across Europe. Finally, for all its dominance, the Calvinist church was 
not able to impose its dogma and discipline on the Dutch faithful. Due to 
the Arminian troubles the quest for discipline and uniformity badly 
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suffered. Arminians and Calvinists fought their battles in the public domain. 
The big winners of the Arminian troubles were the publishing houses; for 
the period between 1610 and 1620 the major Dutch collection of pamphlets 
lists 1368 different publications. Some of them, including some of the so 
called Ferry conversations, that presented their readers with fictive recordings 
of conversations on the ferries that connect the main towns of Holland, 
were more or less civilised. Henricus Slatius, the Arminian author of The 
predestined thief, which offered a conversation between a Calvinist preacher 
and a thief awaiting the death penalty, still used highly amusing satire to 
ridicule predestination. But the highly popular Arminian shit-car (1618) and 
the Song of the hat maker of the Remonstrants, who scolds the children of God for fools 
and madmen, and who wants to put on their head (which belongs to Christ alone) his 
beastly, popish and Antichrist’s hat (1617) showed that in the heat of the debate 
the pen was weak and discipline easily lost. ‘Hot Protestantism’ was the 
result.60 Whilst protestant church consistories sought to promote religious 
discipline and uniformity, protestant pamphleteers lost themselves in ‘Grub-
street’, the world of libel, insult and slander, of violent rhetoric. The town 
magistrates in Holland were unable to curb, if indeed they ever try to do so, 
the development of a public sphere of pamphleteers and printmakers, 
whose loyalties wavered between church and commerce, faith and felony. 
The political culture of pamphlets and prints provided authors and readers 
with novel instruments to fight out their theological and political conflicts in 
the public domain, with levels of participation that were unrivalled in Europe 
– from the church to the ferry. Discord was not squashed but channelled in 
the alleys of ‘Grub street’. In many European countries conflicts were – and 
are – settled by murder, killing and poison; in the Dutch Republic the pen had 
become the mightiest sword. ‘Grub street’ was a major step towards civic and 
civil society, perhaps even to civilization?  
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